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Thesis
The Joint Sea Base (JSB) can act as a critical enabler in satisfying Theater Security Cooperation Planning (TSCP) requirements through the forward positioning of the joint force allowing access to challenging areas without placing large numbers of military personnel permanently ashore. More than ever, it is essential that the United States foster new relationships that build reliable coalition partners throughout the world via TSCP in order to counter today's global and transnational threats. However, access in many regions requiring TSC activities is limited resulting from security restrictions, unfavorable political climates, or the lack of US overseas bases to support these operations. The arguments presented shall accomplish the following:
• Define the JSB and TSCP.
• Examine the role of traditional bases and determine the functions the JSB satisfies.
• Establish a link between the capabilities of the JSB and the dynamic mission of TSC.
• Examine the role the JSB plays in DoD transformation.
• Explores the capabilities of the JSB as it relates to TSCP requirements.
• Discuss the Way Ahead-Joint Sea Base integration and conducting the TSC mission
The intent of the paper is to recommend innovative solutions to assist Combatant Commanders in shaping the theater through Security Cooperation and the JSB.
The Joint Sea Base Defined.
The Seabasing definition varies depending on which service component is asked, and if current capabilities or future capabilities are considered when answering the question. The Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) defines Seabasing as: the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution and reemployment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the joint operational area.
The JIC definition of Seabasing must be understood to include legacy systems in its scope.
Often, Seabasing refers to future capabilities and operations of the US Navy. However, during a recent media roundtable interview with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mullen clarified the Seabasing definition to a reporter, Every ship you mentioned is a sea base. The MPF Future is not the sea base. It should someday be part of it. But what you saw in Indonesia, that's a different sea base. What you see in the Gulf right now is a different sea base. What you saw in Katrina is a different sea base. The hundreds of ships lined up around, from Turkey all the way to the Gulf before OEF. That's another view of the sea base. And I think this is really an important point to make. The sea base is made up of lots of different capabilities. 2 The CNO's comments dispel the idea that the Sea Base and Seabasing are concepts that will exist ten or twenty years in the future with the construction of additional ships. Rather, the JSB describes how the U. S. Navy integrates and operates in conjunction with the joint force today.
The CNO commented in a later interview about the necessity of expanding Seabasing capabilities, and not just associating the term with the production and building of new ships.
When it comes to Sea Power, I want to get at the 'how,'" Mullen said. "I am convinced that if we don't, if we don't take a look around at how we are being utilized by this nation today, and how we may be utilized in the future, we run the risk of not being ready when we are called upon, or not being called upon even if we think we are ready. 3 Clearly, Seabasing is much more than shipbuilding programs. Seabasing is a primary pillar of the "Sea Power 21" concept of operations that describes the standard mode of operations for the United States Navy, joint and sustained operations from the sea. There are many examples profiling these types of operations. One such example occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom. The USS Kitty Hawk acted as an Afloat Forward Staging Base for Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces to conduct long range strikes in Afghanistan. 4 The JSB is about present US Navy capabilities and relevant to how the US military operates today.
What is Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and why is it so important?
Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) are defined as:
all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Subsets of these categories are TSCP activities that include:
• Operational Activities -Forces conducting humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, etc.
• Combined (Multinational) Exercises -Forces involved in multinational exercises • Security Assistance -Grant funding for US arm sales • Combined Training -Host nation training related to equipment purchased from US • Combined Education -Military courses taught in country • Military Contacts -Activities that allow interaction between US and foreign militaries • Humanitarian Assistance -Critical support provided during disaster relief or crisis • Other Engagement Activities -Other TSC activities 8 The reality of a post 9/11 world requires a significant investment of resources in TSCP activities to bring stability to specific "hotspots" or regions of the world. The philosophy behind security cooperation activities is: "buy early with a discount, or buy later at full price, but either way, you have to pay!" In other words, invest now to strengthen US relations, promote good will, gain access, and increase stability in critical regions in order to prevent conflicts or major combat operations in the future. Failure to invest could result in unstable regions, denied US access, a safe haven for terrorists, and increase the likelihood of combat operations in order to eliminate the threat. In peacetime, overseas bases help sustain a stable, predictable environment that promotes economic and political development and, at the same time, maintains and enhances U.S. influence in a region. They provide opportunities for military-tomilitary contacts that are often useful in subsequent collective efforts. In crisis, bases provide the capability to rapidly surge U.S. forces and promote U.S. political interests. 
11
Should large scale humanitarian operations arise, the JSB is well suited to respond quickly and with the capability to properly address emergency situations. Here the JSB provides an invaluable service because of its self-sustaining nature. As recently demonstrated during the Tsunami disaster relief and Hurricane Katrina, the JSB exceeded expectations and was critical in successful disaster relief activities. In many respects the JSB outperformed the "land base" during relief operations due to its self sustaining nature and the number of services provided to the community. For example, during the initial stages of the disaster, the JSB provided a more reliable base of command and control operations than bases ashore due to the significant damage to area infrastructure such as electricity, water, sanitation, etc… Ambassador Likins commented on the importance of the JSB during Hurricane Katrina:
Quickly assembling and operating at sea, the U.S. Navy put together a critical and complex sea-based command, control, and communications network to coordinate sea, land, and air resources to contain the effects and begin restoration operations.
The seemingly seamless coordination of effort and ability to integrate civil and foreign capabilities underscored the maritime component's innate ability to operate at sea under the most challenging conditions. 12 The Ambassador's comments highlight that the JSB can fill the role of an overseas base when access is prohibited. With continued improvement to logistics and the increasing number of Sea Base connectors the JSB will eventually become the optimal platform for conducting security operations in challenging areas around the world.
How is the Joint Sea Base related to Theater Security Cooperation?
Theater Security Cooperation seeks a "unity of effort" for combating the global terrorist threat and provides access to many critical areas in the world today. 13 Conversely, our global basing strategy is the launching platform from which TSC programs are implemented. 14 Since 9/11, most Americans have a better understanding of the terrorist enemy and the challenges associated with the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Many
Americans understand the need for Theater Security Cooperation and realize that America can not "go at it alone" when conducting world affairs. One of our countries most valuable assets is the diplomatic relationships maintained with friends and coalition partners. 15 The
United States' recent history in Iraq demonstrates the necessity of building coalitions for legitimacy when executing foreign policy. International coalitions are the foundation that empowers the United States to effectively fight the GWOT. Nations cooperate with the US in the GWOT because of the realization that transnational threats transcend country borders and threaten society on a global scale. 16 TSCP is the mechanism by which these partnerships are established, nurtured, and developed into productive alliances that foster mutual trust and The JSB and its role in TSCP are well suited. With the rebasing of US forces, and the JSB exploitation of the sea's common areas to access previously restricted areas make it optimal for TSC. General Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, described the benefits of TSC executed via the JSB:
If we are able to do it right in phase zero, I would argue that they won't have to do a phase one, phase two, phase three,"…."With seabasing, with the ability to bring a force in, keep it at sea, put the capabilities that you need into the country, provide the training, provide the medical care, provide the dental care, provide whatever is needed in that particular country and then come back out to sea, you have provided 
Is the Joint Sea Base a key capability for transformation?
The Overseas Basing Commission examined the Global Basing Strategy of the United States. The study reviewed basing strategies, specifically the rebasing of 70,000
personnel from overseas to the Continental United States (CONUS). 20 Interestingly enough, many of the commission's primary concerns were operational requirements, mobility and basing costs. 21 One could argue the JSB strengths meet the rebasing shortfalls presented in the Commission's report. The impact of these factors can be mitigated when employing the JSB.
Operational requirements -The report states that forces must meet force projection demands placed on them under existing strategies and plans. Additionally, training and equipment must be adequate to the task, access to key locations assured. 22 The JSB routinely operates where access is limited, and deploys with training and sustainment sufficient to conduct security cooperation operations from the sea.
Mobility -the commission believed adequate sealift, airlift, and pre-positioned equipment does not exist and that intra-theater airlift is stretched beyond capacity while plans for future assets do not meet the anticipated future demand. 23 While mobility is a valid concern for MCO which requires significant lift resources, TSC operations can be accomplished via current logistics capabilities as demonstrated during the Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.
Rebasing costs-Projected rebasing estimates for 2006-2011 are nine to twelve billion dollars; however an independent study estimated costs to be around twenty billion dollars.
The costs alone ensure the realignment of forces will be a lengthy process. 24 Deployment of the Joint Sea Base could be utilized to maintain a global presence and possibly a cheaper alternative, depending on the scope of operation, when conducting TSC overseas during the realignment of the US military force.
What are the Joint Sea Base capabilities and how can it accomplish the TSC mission?
Combatant Commanders should utilize the JSB to satisfy TSC activities other than port visits or the U.S. Navy responding in a humanitarian assistance role. The U.S. Navy has always conducted these missions very effectively, and while these are important missions for TSCP, the JSB must become fully joint and much broader in scope. Numerous Seabasing assets can comprise the JSB and are available to the Combatant Commanders depending on the nature of the TSC mission: 
The Way Ahead -JSB Integration
With DoD, specifically Directive 3000, expanding the importance of stability building operations, the TSC mission will become a greater priority. Additionally, with rebasing, and the expeditionary capabilities of the JSB, Combatant Commanders will rely more on the JSB to conduct Theater Shaping operations. Therefore, Combatant Commanders must look for innovative ways to integrate all services and government agencies into the TSC mission and satisfy operations via the JSB. Numerous possibilities exist on how the integration could occur, but the following recommendations move in a joint direction that facilitates TSC goals.
• Incorporate Department of State Liaisons.
Directive 3000 states, Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies Over the past 15 years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully…This was true in Somalia, in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan." "I want America's diplomats to eagerly seek out assignments working side by side with our men and women in uniform, whether it is in disaster relief in Pakistan or in stabilization missions in Liberia, or fighting the illegal drug trade in Latin America," "The diplomacy of the 21st century requires better jointness... between our soldiers and our civilians, and we are taking additional steps to achieve it. Familiarization visits to NGO field sites and the organizations headquarters should be conducted when possible. Institute a short internship (one or two months) with NGOs like USAID etc…to better understand these organizations and how they function. These efforts will dispel the negative stereotypes that exist between the military and NGOs and produce a more effective force when integrating with a CMOC on the JSB. These initiatives ultimately facilitate a more effective JSB that better supports the Combatant Commander's TSCP.
The JSB's role in TSC activities
The following list of TSC activities the JSB can conduct is not all inclusive. The following items are listed to stimulate thought and demonstrate that many TSC activities are exportable and can be accomplished from the JSB:
• Leverage the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). The National Guard SPP has prioritized the African mission and acts as a force provider that conducts activities with both military and non-military agencies. 33 In fact, four
States have existing partnerships with countries in the region. 34 The Guard places an emphasis on lower priority nations where EUCOM may not have the resources to provide much focus. The National Guard conducts numerous activities that include military to military and non-military agencies contact such as: counterterrorism, drug interdiction, support to civil authorities, WMD non-proliferation, border security and customs. 35 As the global rebasing strategy takes away resources from EUCOM, the National Guard will be required to fill a greater role in TSC operations. With the Navy postured with the JSB capability, recently taking the lead in JTF HOA, and seeking a greater role in GWOT, it makes sense to partner with the National Guard SPP. In areas where political sensitivities prohibit a large US presence, the JSB working with the SPP will enable the National Guard to maintain a smaller footprint while working from a reliable base of operations. These combined operations will assist the SPP in establishing relationships, maintaining stability and promoting regional access. 36 Leveraging the SPP accomplishes DoS, OSD and Combatant Commander TSC Theater goals, 37 and properly employs the National Guard in short term, TSCP activities.
• • Conferences and Seminars conducted aboard the Joint Sea Base.
The US Navy routinely embarks Distinguished Visitors aboard vessels to profile life on a ship and provide insight into daily operations. When regional security or facilities prohibit conferences from occurring ashore, seminars should be hosted on the Joint Sea Base.
Seminars seldom run more than a two or three days and typically consist of small numbers of personnel that larger ships could easily accommodate.
• Deployment for training.
Deployment for training is defined as US military personnel or units deployment to a foreign country, performing one of its mission tasks (such as road building) and redeploying. 40 Embarking Navy Sea Bees or an Army Engineering Unit for the purposes of building roads, or improving infrastructure should be routine when access is limited and security cooperation activities requiring these services are essential.
Counter argument: Is Seabasing a valid concept that supports TSCP?
The Seabasing concept has many critics. Many throughout DoD believe the US Navy's approach to Seabasing is merely a justification for overpriced shipbuilding programs.
Others believe that keeping men and ships at sea indefinitely is a challenging or impossible task. "Men become fatigued and ships need maintenance." 41 Indefinitely sustaining a JSB presents formidable challenges that have been questioned numerous times. In reality, most Democracy. 44 However, as mentioned earlier, the JSB must become fully integrated, and TSC training enhanced for the JSB to become an optimal platform for accomplishing this mission.
Conclusion
The Joint Sea Base is a proven concept that has the capabilities to accomplish much of the TSCP mission. The JSB provides the access to emerging areas where a US presence is 
